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ABSTRACT. In Distorted Choice in Corporate Bankruptcy, David Skeel offers a nuanced descrip-
tion of restructuring support agreements (RSAs) and how they can help a debtor to achieve the
necessary consensus around a proposed Chapter a plan of reorganization. In this Essay we take
issue with Skeel's permissive view toward RSAs that include provisions, such as pre-disclosure
lock-ups, milestones, and coercive deathtraps, that short circuit the "process" protections con-
tained in Chapter 11. Chapter 11 contemplates bargaining in the shadow of certain basic statutory
"distributional" entitlements: equal treatment, best interests, full cash payment of administrative
expenses, and a guaranteed minimum-cramdown distribution. As such, RSAs can either reinforce
the link between entitlement and distribution, or they can sever it. Skeel insufficiently appreciates
the purpose of process -how procedural protections such as classification, disclosure, and solid-
tation surrounding the vote forge the crucial link between bankruptcy bargaining and core princi-
ples of corporate governance and prebankruptcy entitlement. We offer, instead, an approach which
sorts between process-enhancing RSAs and those that facilitate end-runs.
INTRODUCTION
Historically, there have been two camps in the world of bankruptcy scholar-
ship: the "proceduralists" and the "traditionalists:' The first wave of law-and-
economics scholars in bankruptcy assigned the names, and they chose "proce-
duralist" for themselves.1 The term "traditionalist" had- and still has -a pejo-
rative ring. Proceduralists viewed bankruptcy as a "procedure" for winding up,
restructuring or selling the firm and distributing value according to prebank-
ruptcy entitlements. Thus, the defining case for proceduralists has been Butner
v. United States, which declared that bankruptcy law should generally respect
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1. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, io8 YALE L.J. 573, 585-86 (1998).
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state-law property interests.2 Traditionalists, by contrast, were labeled as de-
fenders of a corrupt redistributive order, built on professional cronyism, path
dependence, and the ability to capitalize on technical statutory expertise. The
proceduralists occupied a clean, efficient world of contract, property, and enti-
tlement-based bargaining, while the traditionalists were consigned to a messy
and cumbersome world of politics and law.
David Skeel has always identified with the law-and-economics school of
bankruptcy scholars, though his work cannot and should not be facilely charac-
terized as "proceduralist." In his thoughtful and useful article, Distorted Choice in
Corporate Bankruptcy,3 Skeel provides a truly useful exploration of restructuring
support agreements (RSAs) -agreements whereby a key creditor or group of
creditors indicates its willingness to support a proposed plan of reorganization.
By examining RSAs, Skeel carefully considers transaction costs and bargaining
impediments that exist in the post-default environment. Nonetheless, his focus
on achieving agreement illustrates, perhaps unintentionally, how the positions
of proceduralists and traditionalists have inverted, both in the academy and in
practice. To the extent that law-and-economics scholars view bankruptcy as
"merely procedure" in service of contract, they undervalue the crucial im-
portance of process itself. Indeed, they cast doubt on whether they are (or were)
serious about respect for prebankruptcy entitlements.4 Procedures like solicita-
tion, disclosure and voting in the shadow of liquidation or cramdown are the
mechanism for maintaining the link between prebankruptcy entitlements and
bankruptcy distributions. In our own work on RSAs, we have focused on distin-
guishing between RSAs that reinforce the plan process and those that undercut
it. It is Skeel's failure to appreciate this distinction that concerns us.
2. 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) ("Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some
federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be
analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing."). As a sign of Butner's importance in the proceduralist worldview, it is the first case ex-
cerpted in Barry E. Adler, Anthony J. Casey & Edward R. Morrison, Baird & Jackson's Bank-
ruptcy: Cases, Problems, and Materials, the standard "proceduralist" casebook. BARRY E. ADLER,
ANTHONY J. CASEY &EDWARD R. MORRISON, BAIRD & JACKSON'S BANKRUPTCY: CASES, PROB-
LEMS, AND MATERIALS 29 (5th ed. 2020). Baird carried the point further, arguing that the point
should apply to nonbankruptcy entitlements generally, and that bankruptcy-specific rules
should be avoided. Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A
Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV 815, 822 (1987).
3. David A. Skeel, Jr., Distorted Choice in Corporate Bankruptcy, 130 YALE L.J. 366 (2020).
4. In a recent manuscript, Anthony Casey is express in his rejection of the importance of pre-
bankruptcy entitlements. See Anthony M. Casey, The New Bargaining Theory of Corporate





The law-and-economics worldview has always been based on a sleight of
hand. For the proceduralist, the word "contract" represented a particular ideal-
ized "Coasean" form of contracting accomplished through costless bargaining
over crystalline Demsetzian property rights.5 Meanwhile, "politics" and "law"
were associated with a dysfunctional "public-choice"-theory-informed view of
legal institutions, a view characterized by special pleading and interest-group
deals. As such, the proceduralist view of bankruptcy as procedural was always
offered in counterdistinction to supposed substantive reallocation of entitle-
ments by the traditionalists. Bankruptcy should be limited to process and should
not redistribute. The irony is that it is now the "traditionalists" who advocate
attention to bankruptcy procedure and distribution with reference to nonbank-
ruptcy entitlement, while recent law-and-economics scholarship turns a blind
eye to both process and legal entitlement in favor of peace at practically any cost.
Skeel's discussion of restructuring support agreements illustrates this inver-
sion. RSAs are contracts about process; pursuant to these agreements, creditors
bind themselves to vote for a proposed reorganization plan when votes are solic-
ited. This facilitates confirmation of a plan but can also distort the confirmation
process itself-in particular the vote. Skeel evaluates these distortive RSAs
through the lens of transaction costs. In this respect, Skeel's article makes a set
of truly useful contributions: (1) identifying the distortions; and (2) exploring
situations where bargaining obstacles may mean that a plan proponent needs
more help than current bankruptcy practice provides.7 In the end, however,
s. Edward J. Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory De-
sign, 43 Aiuz. L. REV. 559, 559-64 (2001); cf R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 8-15, 10 (1960) ("With costless market transactions, the decision of the courts con-
cerning liability for damage would be without effect on the allocation of resources."); Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 5 7 Am. ECON. REV. 347, 356 (1967) ("[A]n owner,
by virtue of his power to exclude others, can generally count on realizing the rewards associ-
ated with husbanding the game and increasing the fertility of his land. This concentration of
benefits and costs on owners creates incentives to utilize resources more efficiently.").
6. Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter
11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 874-83 (2014) [hereinafter Jacoby & Janger, Ice Cube Bonds];
Melissa B. Jacoby &Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing andAllocating Value in Chapter
11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673, 682-709 (2018) [hereinafter Jacoby & Janger, Tracing Equity].
7. Note that we refer to practice rather than the Code, because, by and large, the Code provides
remedies to the problems Skeel identifies, but they must be adapted to current abuses. Here,
Skeel is concerned with holdout behavior and obstruction by various creditor constituencies.
The Code contains a panoply of procedural mechanisms that are designed to help identify and
limit the effects of such behavior. These include the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2018),
and a variety of features in the plan confirmation process, such as the requirement of disclo-
sure, 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2018), the power of the court to designate votes cast in bad faith, 11
U.S.C. § 1126(e), the power to subordinate claims, 11 U.S.C. § 510 (2018), the power to bind
non-consenting class members, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a), and the power to cram-down a non-con-
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Skeel proposes a permissive approach to these agreements that fails to recognize
the integral role of the plan-confirmation process in maintaining bankruptcy
bargaining's tie to prebankruptcy entitlements. Skeel's approach would effec-
tively allow creditors to sever the link between bargaining over value allocation
and the prebankruptcy entitlements that establish the creditors' claim to that
value. Without an account of the purpose of process, Skeel is left without a nor-
mative basis for distinguishing the entitlement-based bargaining in the face of
uncertainty, contemplated by Chapter ii, from a free for all where reorganization
surplus is carved up through a process characterized by bribery and hostage tak-
ing.
The plan-confirmation process contemplates that similarly situated creditors
will vote to accept or reject their treatment under the plan based on adequate
information and without coercion. Skeel recognizes that the "distortions" con-
tained in RSAs undercut these assumptions. They undercut the assumption of
adequate information by obtaining binding commitments to support the plan
prior to the approval of a disclosure statement. They undercut the assumption
of equal treatment by offering creditors different treatment under the plan based
on whether and when they sign up to the RSA. Finally, while the Bankruptcy
Code limits the power of individual creditors to hold out, RSAs can escalate the
level of coercion well beyond that permitted by the Code.
Having identified these distortions, Skeel analyzes the market failures inher-
ent in bankruptcy bargaining and provides an important set of insights into
when distortion is, perhaps, necessary, and therefore permissible, and when it is
not. Skeel's perspective is myopic, however. While he ably examines the tension
between the "legal" aspects of the disclosure and voting process contemplated
by the statute and the practicalities of bargaining in the current world of financial
players and financial instruments, he fails to appreciate fully the importance of
these "legal" aspects and is therefore too quick to acquiesce in their abandon-
ment.
Bankruptcy law does not assume that the idealized conditions for Coasean
bargaining ever exist. Quite the contrary. It recognizes that there are always in-
formational and transaction costs as well as resource disparities that render true
Coasean bargaining impossible. Skeel knows this story well. Indeed, he tells it
himself in his book, Debts Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America.'
The genesis of modern Chapter 11 is itself a response to the abuses of protective-
senting class of creditors, II U.S.C. § 129 (b). These tools are available to the court to rein-
force the plan confirmation process, but they can also be subjected to short cuts and end-runs.
The pulling and tugging between debtor, creditors, and the court sometimes resembles noth-
ing more than a game of whack-a-mole.




committee deposit agreements-the predecessor instrument to RSAs. The de-
fining feature of pre-New Deal restructurings were "protective committees," a
collective-action device for dispersed securityholders.? Bondholders were en-
couraged to enter into "deposit agreement[s]" with the committees that gave the
committees the right to vote on the bonds in the bankruptcy.10
The perceived inequities resulting from these restructurings led the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission to undertake a massive study of protective com-
mittees in the 1930s.1 1 The findings of the study were the basis for both the
Chandler Act of 1938,12 on which modern Chapter 11 is based, and the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939,13 a sister act covering out-of-court bond restructurings.
The Chandler Act embodied the "traditionalist" approach to bankruptcy, which
was deeply suspicious of these RSA-type coordination devices precisely because
they were understood to lock-in abuses of the restructuring process by senior
creditors and incumbent management. The response of the Chandler Act, and
later Chapter 11, to these abuses was to establish: (1) a set of process protections
that guard creditors against attempts by debtors and powerful creditors to
steamroll the process; and (2) an entitlement baseline to limit the power of cred-
itor holdouts to obstruct.
The "process" protections imposed by the Code include classification, dis-
closure, solicitation, and voting rules.14 These process protections, in turn, en-
9. SEC. EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WOR, ACTIVITIES,
PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES PART II:
COMMITTEES AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 1-2 (1937).
10. SEC. EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WOR, ACTIVITIES,
PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES PART I:
STRATEGY AND TECHNIQUES OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 586 (1937)
("The deposit agreement has in many respects been the foundation of the control which com-
mittees dominated by the inside group have been able to obtain over the security holders.").
11. Id.; see also Charles J. Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 A.B.L L.
REV. 5, 29-31 (1995).
12. The Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840; see also Tabb, supra note 11, at 29-31.
13. REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WOR, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNC-
TIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES: PART VI, TRUSTEES UNDER INDEN-
TURES (1936); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, Pub. L. 76-253, 53 Stat. 1149 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77aaa-77bbbb (2018)).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2018) (classification); 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (disclosure and solicitation); 11 U.S.C.
§ 1126 (voting). In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., the Supreme Court cautioned against
"transactions that ... circumvent the Code's procedural safeguards." 137 S. Ct. 973, 986
(2017) (citing In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 70o E2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983) (prohibiting an
attempt to "short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for confirmation of a reorganization
plan by establishing the terms of the plan sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets")); In re
Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983) (reversing a Bankruptcy Court's approval of
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sure that bargaining happens in the shadow of certain basic statutory "distribu-
tional" entitlements: equal treatment,15 best interests,16 full cash payment of ad-
ministrative expenses,17 and a guaranteed minimum-cramdown distribution. "
The process requirements surrounding the vote thus forge the crucial link be-
tween bankruptcy bargaining and both core principles of corporate governance
and prebankruptcy entitlement.
It is here that Skeel falls short: he ignores the tie between process and enti-
tlement when allocating value in a Chapter 11 case. As we will explore later, Skeel
falls into three classic proceduralist traps: (1) confusing the enforceability of pre-
bankruptcy legal entitlements against the debtor with their entitlement to prior-
ity over other creditors upon default; (2) confusing formal priority with realiza-
ble value of that priority under nonbankruptcy law; and, most importantly, (3)
failing to appreciate the relevance of realizable prebankruptcy entitlements to
bankruptcy bargaining. The result is that Skeel would tolerate distortive RSAs
that sweep away both the respect of process and the respect for prebankruptcy
entitlements that informed the proceduralists' vision of the Bankruptcy Code as
"process" rather than "substance."
This is the proceduralist inversion (and it is not unique to Skeel). By failing
to appreciate the link between process and entitlement, Skeel would allow dis-
tortion of the voting process in service of contract. And, by focusing only on the
goal of achieving a "contract," Skeel misses that the purpose of bankruptcy's pro-
cess is not merely to facilitate creditor coordination, but also to ensure fairness
in distribution. The "distortions" that Skeel would tolerate in RSAs include: (1)
vote buying by enhancing distributions to creditors who sign the RSA; (2) death
traps that punish creditors who do not sign the RSA; and (3) commitments to
vote before full information is available. Skeel's approach would thus facilitate a
world characterized by corruption, duress, and deception.19
an asset sale after holding that a U.S.C. § 363 does not "grant[] the bankruptcy judge carte
blanche " or "swallow[] up Chapter 11's safeguards"); In re Biolitec, Inc., 528 B.R. 261, 269
(Bankr. D.N.J. 2014) (rejecting a structured dismissal because it "seeks to alter parties' rights
without their consent and lacks many of the Code's most important safeguards"); cf In re
Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, i8 (2d Cir. 2009) (approving an 11 U.S.C. § 363 asset sale because
the bankruptcy court demonstrated "proper solicitude for the priority between creditors and
deemed it essential that the [s]ale in no way upset that priority"), vacated as moot, 130 S. Ct.
1015 (2009).
15. iiU.S.C. § 1129 (b)(1).
16. iiU.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
17. iiU.S.C. § 1129(a) (9) (A).
18. iiU.S.C. § 1129 (b)(2).
19. The statutory deathtrap ties bargaining to entitlement. The restructuring support agreement





In previous works, we have argued together, and with others, for a different
approach. In our view, the way to preserve the link between bankruptcy bargain-
ing and legal entitlement is to address the problems of corruption, duress, and
deception directly-by protecting the process, rather than tolerating distor-
tions.20 We advocate that approach here.
This Essay will proceed in four steps. First, it will offer a capsule version of
Skeel's argument. That argument is framed as a critique of the "badges of op-
portunism" approach to RSAs - a position we take in a recent article.2 1 Second,
it will briefly lay out the comprehensive vision of Chapter 11 (largely descrip-
tively) developed in earlier articles by us" and Melissa Jacoby.23 Third, we will
show that Skeel's approach to RSAs is likely to result in an elevation of power
over entitlement, with dangerous consequences for both governance and fair-
ness. Fourth, this Essay proposes an alternative solution to the problems, help-
fully identified by Skeel, that maintains the link between entitlement and value
allocation in Chapter 11 cases.
I. WHAT IS AN RSA?
RSAs are contracts, but they are a special kind of contract: a contract under
which a creditor pledges to vote in favor of a plan of reorganization. Pledging
one's vote, or endorsing a candidate or outcome, is a common attribute in voting
systems, but the law often places limits on such practices. Votes procured
through corruption, coercion, or deception are generally not recognized.24 The
20. We note a parallel debate in antitrust law. The law-and-economics view of antitrust elimi-
nated bright-line "per se" rules that characterized traditional (i.e., pre-198o) antitrust, in fa-
vor of a much more permissive "rule of reason" analysis that prioritizes "consumer welfare"
over competitive markets. Lina M. Khan, The End of Antitrust History Revisited, 133 HARv. L.
REV. 1655, 1675-76 (2020) (reviewing TIM Wu, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE
NEw GILDED AGE (2018)). Progressive antitrust scholars are calling for the field to return to
its doctrinal roots. Id. at 1663-64; see also Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust's De-
mocracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2544 (2013) ("Today's unbalanced [antitrust] sys-
tem puts too much control in the hands of technical experts, moving antitrust enforcement
too far away from its democratic roots.").
21. Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, Badges of Opportunism: Principlesfor Policing Restructuring
Support Agreements, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &CoM. L. 169 (2018).
22. EdwardJ. Janger &AdamJ. Levitin, One Dollar, One Vote: Mark-to-Market Governance in Bank-
ruptcy, 104 IOWAL. REv. 1857, 1860-67 (2019).
23. Jacoby & Janger, Ice Cube Bonds, supra note 6, at 874-83; Jacoby & Janger, Tracing Equity, supra
note 6, at 682-709.
24. This prohibition is not directly stated, but it inheres in the combined effect of a U.S.C.
§ 1126(b)(1) (2018), which governs the manner in which the acceptance is procured by the
debtor, and 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e), which governs the manner in which the vote is cast by the
claimant or interest holder.
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line dividing permissible horse trading and bribery, or freely given support from
coerced support, or good-faith disclosure and fraud, is not always easy to ascer-
tain. Skeel's discussion of "distortions" seeks to identify the point at which solic-
iting support for the plan by obtaining pledged votes becomes corrupt, involun-
tary, or a scam.
A. RSAs and the Chapter ii Plan Process
To draw this line, it is necessary to situate RSAs within the broader context
of Chapter ii.
In brief, a Chapter ii reorganization proceeds as follows. First, the debtor
finds itself in financial difficulty, unable, or imminently unable, to pay all of its
creditors in a timely fashion. The debtor then attempts to negotiate with its cred-
itors, hoping to stay afloat.25 This may involve seeking adjustments to repay-
ment terms, interest rates, or even reducing the debtor's principal. If the debtor
can reach a sufficient number of agreements with its creditors individually or
collectively, it can avoid bankruptcy.
If a sufficient number of agreements cannot be reached, the debtor files for
bankruptcy. This may be because the debtor concluded that no reorganization
was feasible (in which case it liquidates), or the debtor may desire a second op-
portunity to finalize a restructuring- this time with the benefit of bankruptcy
law's coercive procedures and creditor protections.26
Bankruptcy offers two routes to confirmation of a restructuring plan: (1)
"consensual" confirmation, which is a little coercive; and (2) "cramdown" con-
firmation, which is more so. Under consensual confirmation, the various credi-
tor constituencies vote, hopefully approving the plan by the statutorily required
majorities.27 Under cramdown, an objecting class of creditors may still be bound
if: (a) the debtor pays objecting secured creditors the value of their collateral; or,
25. The Bankruptcy Code expressly contemplates that such negotiations may happen and seeks
to preserve any gains made through such negotiations. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125-1126; see also Century
Glove, Inc. v. First Am. Bank of N.Y., 86o F.2d 94, 101-03 ( 3d Cir. 1988) (rejecting an inter-
pretation of the statute that would "inhibit free creditor negotiations").
26. In some cases, the debtor may file for bankruptcy because the restructuring is conditioned on
some form of relief available only in bankruptcy, such as renegotiation of union contracts, 11
U.S.C. § 1113, or assumption of an executory contract, 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2018).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c). A consensual confirmation merely requires the consent of all impaired
classes, with consent determined by a majority vote of the class. Consensual confirmation




(b) if the objecting class consists of unsecured creditors, the distribution com-
plies with the absolute-priority rule under which unsecured creditors receive the
residual equity of the recapitalized firm and old equity is wiped out.28
In sum, Chapter 11 creates a structured bargaining process, in which the
debtor seeks the creditors' assent (in sufficient majorities), while the creditors
negotiate in the shadow of liquidation or their cramdown entitlement. The two
central features of this architecture are: (1) a fair process of disclosure, solicita-
tion, and voting; and (2) the ability to establish an enforceable entitlement base-
line.
Outside of bankruptcy, a debtor putting together a restructuring faces severe
coordination problems. Since all significant creditors must agree to the deal, each
has an incentive to hold out. Bankruptcy law helps close the deal by limiting the
power of holdouts, but a deal still must be struck that will satisfy the statutory
majorities. This is where RSAs come in. In its most benign form, an RSA is
merely an indication of support for a term sheet hat allows the debtor to line up
support for the plan. This support may be secured before the petition is filed or
after. Regardless, the consummation of the deal is conditioned on, and remains
subject to, compliance with the plan confirmation process. If this were all that
was at stake, we would not be concerned.
But RSAs have a dark side, reflected by their other name: "lockup agree-
ments." Depending on how an RSA is constructed and how it is used, it can sup-
port the plan process or subvert it. Subversions come in two flavors: (1) RSAs
can distort the voting process; and (2) RSAs can distort the distributional
scheme. The two are not mutually exclusive, and each is troubling in its own
right.29 Further, the voting process can be distorted in three ways, each of which
can be framed as benign or malign: (1) incentives/vote buying (corruption); (2)
incentives/deathtraps (coercion);30 and (3) streamlined disclosure/concealment
(deceit). Again, these distortions are not mutually exclusive, and the line be-
tween what should be permitted and what should be proscribed is hard to draw.
28. 11U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2) (B).
29. Indeed, they are intertwined. Since consensual confirmation is not subject to the absolute pri-
ority rule, the creditors can vote to adjust the distributional scheme. A distorted vote can lead
to a distorted distribution, and vice versa.
30. A "deathtrap" in an RSA subjects creditors to a coercive set of alternative treatments, in which
a creditor supporting a plan will be treated better than one opposing the plan if the plan is
confirmed. The effect of a deathtrap provision is to pressure a creditor to vote for a plan by
making opposition costly if the plan is confirmed. This element of coercion is also present in
the cramdown provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, a U.S.C. § 1129 (b). Indeed, Skeel notes
that so-called "deathtrap" provisions in RSAs can be likened to "cramdowns on the cheap."
Skeel, supra note 3, at 386.
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Skeel seeks to discern when distortion of the voting process may be necessary
to overcome coordination problems. The principal conceptual contributions of
Skeel's article are his rules of thumb for considering when "distortions" are act-
ing in service of the plan process and when they are undercutting it. He offers
his rules of thumb in the hope that they will thread the needle. Unfortunately,
he takes a wrong turn. Again, because he ignores the link between process and
entitlement, he would permit RSAs that include voting and distributional dis-
tortions, so long as they assist in the "consensual" confirmation of a plan.31 By
contrast, we would only permit RSAs that reinforce, rather than distort the plan
process itself, even if this puts ultimate confirmation at risk.
B. RSAs and Distortion: The Rules of Thumb
Skeel offers a typology-four "rules of thumb"-to consider in evaluating
distortive RSAs: (1) the likelihood of holdout behavior; (2) the degree of coer-
cion; (3) the presence of independent justifications; and (4) the extent to which
creditors were granted contractual veto rights prebankruptcy." These four cri-
teria represent important insights, but in our view, they do not justify the dis-
tortions that Skeel would tolerate.
1. Holdouts
As noted above, the problem of holdouts is the reason for Chapter ii. When
multiple creditors must consider the problem of a debtor's general default, put-
ting together a deal for continuation of the business is extremely difficult. This
is true for a variety of reasons. Independent of legal entitlements, financial dis-
ress gives many parties practical vetoes over the debtor's future operations. Sup-
pliers can stop shipping, landlords may evict, creditors may exercise remedies.
Any one creditor has the power to trigger a death spiral. Further, even if the
creditors trust the debtor and believe in the debtor's business, they have no rea-
son to trust each other. The structure of state debtor/creditor law also rewards
those who exercise their legal and transactional leverage early. Finally, in the
modern environment, entities can trade claims, allowing creditors to trade their
way into blocking positions that give them holdout power in plan negotiations.
In short, keeping a deal together is difficult.
So, Skeel points out, procedural techniques that help overcome the possibil-
ity of holdouts can be beneficial. An RSA can do this, as a practical matter, by
allowing creditors to signal to each other that they support the plan. But Skeel is
31. Skeel, supra note 3, at 392-95




also worried about a particular type of holdout- one using its practical power
strategically, either to obstruct the plan or to bargain for a greater return. He
points to the Momentive case as one where an identifiable strategic holdout was
present.33 In such cases, he suggests, coercive techniques in the form of carrots
and sticks may be more tolerable. He identifies two such provisions: a deathtrap
and a sweetener.
A deathtrap is a plan provision that proposes to pay one distribution to cred-
itors (or classes) who vote for the plan and a different (lower distribution) to
those who vote against it. Alternatively, the plan might offer incentives that re-
ward early plan supporters, or those that sign the RSA with enhanced distribu-
tions.
Skeel notes, correctly, that these techniques must be judged against the fact
that the Bankruptcy Code itself is not neutral with regard to holdouts.34 First,
the Bankruptcy Code contains its own statutory "deathtrap:' Indeed, it contains
two. Individual creditors who vote against a proposed plan run the risk that the
plan will fail, leaving them with a liquidation-based distribution.35 Further, clas-
ses that reject the plan can be bound, so long as they receive a distribution that
respects the realizable value of their prebankruptcy entitlements.36 Second, de-
cisions and treatment are determined by class: all class members rise or fall to-
gether.3 7 Individual creditors cannot be separately coerced or incentivized.
Third, the Code has rules for solicitation and voting that would seem to prohibit
a formal solicitation outside the plan process. Courts have limited the definition
of solicitation to the actual act of soliciting a vote.38 But courts looking at RSAs
have wrestled with the question of when such a contract becomes a solicitation.39
33. In re MPM Silicones, LLC. (Momentive), 518 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).
34 Skeel characterizes the Code as having a pro-reorganization bias. We disagree with Skeel that
the Code's voting rule can be either pro- or anti-reorganization. Instead, Chapter 11 is pro-
governance. It provides a collective decisionmaking mechanism where none would otherwise
exist, but it does not dictate a particular means by which the creditors should realize the value
of their claims. Instead, we fear that the procedural shortcuts facilitated by an RSA may give
the debtor too much power to advantage particular creditors and steamroll others.
35. 1 U.S.C. § 1126 (2018).
36. 11U.S.C. § n29(b) (2) (A).
37. 11U.S.C. § 1123(a) (1).
38. Century Glove, Inc. v. First Am. Bank of N.Y., 86o R2d 94, 101-03 (3d Cir. 1988).
39. Compare In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC, 486 B.R. 286, 293-95 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013) (holding
that the designation and disregard of postpetition votes was not warranted), with In re NH
Holdings, Inc., 288 B.R. 356, 362 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (designating and isqualifying votes
cast under lock-up agreement executed postpetition), and In re Stations Holding Co., No. 02-
10882(MFW), 2002 WL 31947022, at *3 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 30, 2002) (designating and
disqualifying votes of creditors who signed a "lock-up" agreement).
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Skeel would tolerate distortions that go further than the Code, but only if
there is either an identified holdout, or if holdout behavior is likely, either for
reasons having to do with the debtor's business or because claims trading is oc-
curring that might facilitate the accumulation of blocking positions. This injunc-
tion to look at the structure of the business and the liquidity of the claims trading
is perhaps Skeel's most useful insight. But two wrongs may not make a right.
We worry about coercive techniques that go beyond what the Bankruptcy Code
contemplates. Instead, we would focus on the Bankruptcy Code's powers to dis-
cipline bad behavior directly, such as the power to disqualify votes. We would
not turn a blind eye to bad behavior by debtors, even where it is in response to
bad behavior by creditors.40
2. Degree of Coercion
The second rule of thumb, degree of coercion, is obviously related to the first.
If there are holdouts or other strategic players within the bankruptcy, then some
coordinating device may be needed to manage them. The question then becomes
what coercion ought to be permitted? Or, as Skeel frames it, how much distor-
tion is too much? Here, he arrays the types of coercion along a useful spectrum.4 1
On one end is a traditional RSA that commits a creditor to support a particular
plan but that (1) allows post-disclosure vote switching if there is a material
change; and (2) is subject to higher and better offers. More stringent exit terms
are obviously problematic. And then there are both entitlement and procedural
distortions. Entitlement coercion offers an improved recovery for cooperation.
Procedural coercion adds sweeteners to early signers. Both of these types of co-
ercion strike us as extremely problematic.
Here, we do not object to Skeel's useful spectrum. Rather our concern is that
Skeel offers no principle for deciding where to draw the line. Skeel argues that
because "the risk of problematic holdout behavior will be significant" in most
large corporate bankruptcies, a certain amount of distortion is necessary.4 2 We
disagree. In an earlier article we took the position that entitlement-distorting
RSAs that ought to be proscribed.43 Similarly, RSAs that undercut the statutory
processes of voting should also be prohibited. Skeel, by contrast, would tolerate
a fair amount of distortion in pursuit of agreement.
40. See infra text accompanying note 42. In our view, the power to designate and disqualify votes
under § 1126(e) should be extended to include creditors who are "short" or who have signifi-
cantly "hedged" their position.
41. Skeel, supra note 3, at 398-401.
42. Id at 397.




Skeel's argument proves too much. He looks at the coordinating effects of
bankruptcy procedure, but he fails to appreciate how that process seeks to link
value allocation to prebankruptcy entitlements. The Chapter 11 plan-confirma-
tion process binds dissenters and can discharge debt without consent. Bank-
ruptcy is itself a coordinating device, such that additional private coordinating
add-ons should be viewed with some suspicion, as they lack bankruptcy's sub-
stantive-fairness requirements and the imprimatur of legislation. In our view,
the price of a Chapter 11 restructuring is adherence to both the procedural and
substantive guaranties of fairness. Bankruptcy process serves a purpose. It pre-
serves the link between prebankruptcy entitlements and a negotiated restructur-
ing. Skeel is prepared to allow creditors to contract away these procedural pro-
tections because he is willing to allow distortions not just to process but to
entitlement. This is what we mean by the proceduralist inversion. By failing to
adhere to the requirements of bankruptcy process, the tie between Chapter 11
distributions and prebankruptcy entitlements is lost.
3. Independent Justifications
The third rule of thumb, independent justifications, suggests that some dis-
tortions may have justificatory rationales that go beyond coercing consent. Here,
Skeel points toward the success fees that are sometimes paid to early participants
in the RSA process if a plan is confirmed. Skeel states that the coordinating effort
that a creditor invests in an RSA is a public good: creditors who help coordinate
benefit the estate as a whole and so should be compensated. He likens these fees
to the breakup fees that are sometimes paid to stalking-horse bidders if they are
outbid or if the deal does not close. Courts often approve such fees as part of a
sale order in recognition of the effort and expense of preparing a bid. Success
fees, Skeel argues, operate on the same principle in that they compensate the
creditor for value given to the estate. Indeed, he points out that such fees could
be approved by the court under ii U.S.C. 5o3(b)( 3)(D), which permits compen-
sation for creditors who make a substantial contribution to the case."
But this argument, while insightful, again, proves too much. Just as a
"deathrap provision" can be characterized as "cramdown on the cheap," an in-
ventive or success fee can be characterized as an "administrative expense claim
on the cheap." But that is the point: just as the coercive aspects of the plan process
all come with procedural protections associated with the vote, administrative ex-
pense priority should only be granted to a creditor upon a finding of benefit to
the estate. Here, the missing piece in Skeel's logic is a judicial finding that the
creditors' efforts benefitted the estate as a whole.
44. ii U.S.C. 503(b) (3) (D) (2018).
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4. Contracted Vetoes
Skeel's fourth rule of thumb, vetoes embodied in contract, is more problem-
atic. For the first three "rules of thumb," we agree with Skeel's underlying in-
sight, but disagree about whether it justifies a procedural shortcut. Here, we
question Skeel's underlying rationale. Skeel argues that RSAs should not be used
to override vetoes that were contracted for prebankruptcy. These can include
terms in intercreditor agreements, asset partitions, and so on. This particular
rule of thumb confuses us. While we understand why bankruptcy law should
respect prebankruptcy distributional entitlements (indeed, that is the sine qua
non of the plan confirmation process), we fail to see why that solicitude carries
over to prebankruptcy contracts about post-bankruptcy process, and especially
to veto rights that affect the plan process as a whole. Indeed, that is just the sort
of contract that the Bankruptcy Code routinely overrides. A debtor cannot waive
the benefit of the automatic stay for the benefit of a single creditor. A debtor
cannot waive the procedures of the plan process for the benefit of a single credi-
tor either. These protections belong to all creditors - consensual, nonconsensual,
those at the table and those who are not.
It is possible that some of these contracts may be between creditors, rather
than with the debtor itself. In intercreditor agreements, for example, one credi-
tor may promise not to assert its rights in bankruptcy until another creditor has
been paid in full. To the extent that these agreements are merely bilateral, they
can be asserted as a matter of contract between the parties. However, they can
also rise to the level of frustrating the rights of other creditors. If this occurs, we
see no reason to privilege them.
If holdout behavior is problematic, we fail to see why it is less problematic
because holdout power was contracted for in advance. One answer might be that
the holdout power was disclosed prebankruptcy, so other creditors are on notice.
Not all agreements are disclosed, however, and not all creditors can adjust. We
see little reason that such agreements should get special solicitude over other
creditors seeking to maximize the value of the business and their claims.
In sum, we appreciate the insights Skeel's rules of thumb generate, but ques-
tion whether they justify procedural shortcuts that undercut the integrity of the
vote and the plan confirmation process. We would not only police RSAs more
closely, we would do so differently. In our view, the coordination function of an
RSA is valuable, and RSAs should be permitted when they support not just a
particular plan, but the plan process. RSAs that support the process reinforce the
tie between bargaining and entitlement in bankruptcy. By contrast, coercion that





We would also address Skeel's concerns about holdouts differently. We
would enhance existing mechanisms in the Bankruptcy Code that limit the pow-
ers of holdouts. Furthermore, we would encourage courts to enforce provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code that enforce a clear entitlement baseline. We explain our
alternative in the next Part.
II. ENTITLEMENT AND OPPORTUNISM IN CHAPTER 11: THE
STEAMROLLER AND THE HOLDOUT
Skeel clearly appreciates the value of Chapter 11 in facilitating rescue. His
tolerance for distortions springs from a desire to reach agreement on efficient,
value-preserving restructurings where either the business continues or asset syn-
ergies and other synergies are preserved. We share that appreciation. We also
recognize, along with Skeel, that the modern Chapter ii environment has been
fundamentally changed by (1) the desire for speedy resolution; and (2) the ad-
vent of claims trading and distressed debt investing. However, instead of toler-
ating further distortions to the process, we would favor addressing those
changes directly. Do not eliminate creditor protections to speed the process; in-
stead, develop a mechanism for preserving and respecting entitlements. Do not
tolerate vote distortion to deal with claims trading; rather, reform the voting
process to deal with claims trading.
In a recent article, Badges of Opportunism: Principles for Policing Restructuring
Support Agreements,45 we argue that RSAs should be prohibited if they seek to
short circuit the plan process, distort statutory priorities, or both. Skeel takes
issue with our prescriptive view. Here, we double down. We wish not only to
defend our position, but to flesh it out. The views articulated in that article were
merely the tip of an iceberg. They reflect a broader vision of bankruptcy that ties
bargaining to entitlement through the plan-confirmation process. Skeel's distor-
tions would sever that link. The broad architecture that stands behind Badges of
Opportunism is contained in a trilogy of articles by us and Melissa Jacoby. The
first addresses the entitlement baseline. The second addresses concerns about
efforts by debtors and dominant creditors to resolve cases with lightning speed.
The third addresses the problems of claims trading and obstruction.
As we have noted above, the legitimacy of bankruptcy bargaining lies in the
existence of an entitlement baseline. In Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating
Value in Chapter 11,46 Janger and Jacoby explore the relationship between pre-
bankruptcy entitlements and value allocation in Chapter ii. That article explains
how Chapter ii preserves the relationship between prebankruptcy entitlements
45. Janger & Levitin, supra note 21.
46. Jacoby & Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 6.
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and distributions pursuant to a confirmed plan, even when the values of assets
and the firm itself change during the pendency of the case. Janger and Jacoby
explain that Chapter ii envisions a two-step process of realization. First, Chapter
11 envisions an equitable realization upon the opening of a proceeding that crys-
tallizes the relative position of creditors vis-a-vis each other. Second, it contem-
plates a realization of value, through sale or recapitalization, that is allocated
through a process of bargaining in the shadow of entitlements (based on the
realizable value of those claims outside of bankruptcy).
In our view, there are only two paths that will allow alteration of prebank-
ruptcy entitlements through Chapter 11: first, confirmation of a consensual plan
of reorganization accepted by any impaired classes of creditors; or second, a tra-
ditional cramdown through satisfaction of the judicially ratified statutory enti-
tlement. Notwithstanding its colorful name, a "cramdown" is a calibrated pro-
cess that limits the leverage of holdouts, encourages dissemination of
information, assigns entitlements, and then allows for bargaining in conditions
of uncertainty. Indeed, without this process, there would be a far worse "liqui-
dation deathtrap" - creditors would be coerced to come to a consensual resolu-
tion lest they be left with their nonbankruptcy remedies and the specter of a "race
of diligence."'
Like Skeel, we recognize that modern bankruptcy practice has put a great
emphasis on speeding cases through bankruptcy, running roughshod over the
plan confirmation process. In Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in
Chapter ii Cases,48 Jacoby and Janger address the problem of speed. Like Skeel,
they note that the timeline in Chapter 11 cases has accelerated.49 They look at
hurry-up, all-asset sales in Chapter ii and argue that they operated as an end-
run around the plan process. The concern is that these hurry-up sales are being
used to reallocate value to the purchaser, senior lender, and management, and
away from other key creditor constituencies.5 o Unlike Skeel, Jacoby and Janger's
solution is not to tolerate the distortion but, instead, to identify a mechanism
that preserves the procedural protections of the plan process -the "Ice Cube
Bond." Jacoby and Janger argue that a sale must either be conducted pursuant to
a confirmed plan, or sale proceeds needed to be retained to preserve decisions
47. See Race of Diligence, BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY (loth ed. 2014).
48. Jacoby & Janger, Ice Cube Bonds, supra note 6.
49. Id. at 865 ("Hurry-up all-asset sales under § 363 of the Code ... are now a common feature
in the bankruptcies of large public companies.").
so. Id. at 916 ("The speed demanded in an alleged melting ice cube sale can .... [r]eallocate[]
unencumbered value from the bankruptcy estate to the secured creditor without any clear ba-




about value allocation for the plan process.5 1 Rather than acceding to a distor-
tion, Janger and Jacoby offer a mechanism that recognizes the need for speed
while maintaining the link between bargaining and entitlement.
Finally, claims trading and the increased liquidity of distressed debt have cre-
ated the opposite problem. Professional investors now have novel opportunities
to purchase claims and engage in obstructive behavior. In One Dollar, One Vote:
Mark-to-Market Governance in Bankruptcy,5 2 we look at the problem of creditors
who seek to use the voting process to obstruct confirmation. Again, we join Skeel
in his concern about the effects of claims trading on the bankruptcy process. But
rather than tolerating voting distortions, we seek to adapt the voting process to
the new reality by reducing the power of holdouts directly. We advocate three
reforms to limit the ability of various types of claimants to exercise power over
plan confirmation beyond that reflected by their real economic interest. To that
end: (1) where a claim was purchased, the voting rights would be established by
the purchase price, not the par value of the debt (mark to basis); (2) where a
claim was hedged, the voting rights would be limited to the creditor's actual eco-
nomic interest (mark to interest); and (3) where a secured creditor sought to
credit bid, its credit bidding rights would be limited to the realizable value of the
collateral (mark to value).33 These changes would affect only voting rights -not
distributional rights - and all but the first could be adopted by courts under cur-
rent law. The effect would be that blocking positions would be harder to pur-
chase and economic shorts would not be able to affect the future of the debtor.
Again, rather than distorting the vote, we would defend its integrity.
III. CORRUPTION, COERCION AND HASTE
Again, we want to emphasize that Skeel's article provides an incredibly useful
elaboration of the various RSAs used in important recent cases such as Puerto
Rico, Momentive, Arch Coal, and others. It also shows how useful RSAs can be in
helping a debtor craft consensus around a plan of reorganization. However, we
are concerned that the distortions that Skeel would tolerate are far from benign.
The Bankruptcy Code envisions a bargaining process based on prebankruptcy
entitlements. The pragmatic distortions described by Skeel lead in fairly short
order to a plan process that is characterized by situational leverage and expedi-
ence. The proceduralist concern with entitlement gives way to the primacy of the
deal. Prebankruptcy entitlements give way to allocations of power in the vicinity
51. Id. at 925.
52. Janger & Levitin, supra note 22.
53. Id. at 1916-19.
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of insolvency-what Jared Ellias and Robert Stark have recently characterized as
"bankruptcy hardball."4
Skeel identifies two novel dynamics in modern Chapter 11 cases: (1) the need
for speed; and (2) the liquidity of claims.55 He further identifies three distortions
that have arisen to address those developments: (1) entitlement-based coercion;
(2) process-based coercion; and (3) procedural shortcuts.56 He would tolerate all
three types of distortion, if necessary, to address opportunistic creditor-holdout
behavior. But in doing so, he underplays the dark side of each of the distortions.
The distortions are simply "bankruptcy hardball" by another name.
Entitlement-based coercion is another way of saying that the debtor offers a
special deal to creditors who support the proposed plan. This is vote buying,
plain and simple, and it violates the fundamental bankruptcy principle that sim-
ilarly situated claims should be treated similarly.57 Process-based coercion is, in
some ways, worse. Such coercion can take many forms. The debtor might offer
distributional sweeteners to first adopters. The agreement might limit the ability
of creditors to change their votes upon receiving new information, or punish
themfor doing so. If a sale is involved, large bidder protections or breakup fees
might discourage both other buyers and dissemination of information. Speed,
usually viewed as a virtue, may operate as a way of concealing information and
also ensuring that opposition to the plan does not emerge.5 8
One reason that Skeel may be more tolerant of distortion than we are is the
nature of the parties he sees as mattering to the dispute. In a key passage Skeel
says the following:
[C] reditors who negotiate the terms of an RSA- and thus[] a potential
reorganization plan- provide a public good, since reorganization may
be valuable for everyone, and they also forgo the opportunity to trade
during the negotiations. The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code assumed
the creditors' committee would play this role, rather than individual
54. Jared A. Ellias & RobertJ. Stark, Bankruptcy Hardball, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 745, 748 n.1o (2020)
(coining the term "bankruptcy hardball" to describe a "universe of aggressive tactics in
debtor-creditor relations" that, though not always new, are now being deployed with greater
frequency and intensity).
. Skeel, supra note 3, at 373-74.
56. Skeel, supra note 3, at 384-88.
57. See 11 U.S.C. S 1122(a) (2018) (requiring classes to contain only substantially similar claims);
§ 1123(a) (4) (requiring all claims in a class to be treated the same).
58. See William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, The New Bond Workouts, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1597,
16o1, 1639 (2018) (noting the use of coercive hurry-up techniques in out-of-court workouts




creditors. But in current cases, the creditors' committee often is not the princi-
pal locus of negotiations, because, among other things ... the 'fulcrum"
class ... is a class of lien creditors rather than the general creditors whom the
creditors' committee represents.59
The "fulcrum" security is the class of claimants that receives the equity of the
reorganized business. They are the most junior claim in the distributional hier-
archy to receive a distribution and hence bear the risks and receive the rewards
of ownership.
For reasons that we explore more fully in Tracing Equity, Logic and Limits of
Liens, and Ice Cube Bonds,60 a proper understanding of the nature of secured
credit under state law precludes the view that a secured creditor can ever be the
fulcrum security in a rescue case. As Jacoby and Janger explain, outside of bank-
ruptcy, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the state law of real-estate
mortgages grant secured creditors a lien on the property of the debtor, but they
do not constitute a lien on the firm itself.61 In England and Wales, the secured
creditor may take a "floating charge."2 In the United States, no such thing exists.
Security is asset based, and attaches to the property of the firm, not the firm
itself.63 Even if it did, the two-step realization process in Chapter ii would limit
the allowed secured claim of a secured creditor to the realizable value of assets
liened on the petition date, along with identifiable proceeds.64 This means that
even when a senior secured lender is underwater, there will be unencumbered
value available to unsecured creditors -including to the secured lender on ac-
count of its unsecured deficiency claim. Even when the secured creditors are un-
dersecured, value will flow through to the unsecured creditors.
Skeel, however, fails to acknowledge that an RSA locking in a deal between
an undersecured senior lender and the debtor will have the effect of steamrolling
the entitlements of unsecured creditors who are entitled to a share of any going
concern surplus. The value of these residual unsecured claims may be hard to
calculate in the heat of a Chapter 11 case. But that is precisely why preserving,
not rushing, the voting process is essential.
5g. Skeel, supra note 3, at 401 (emphasis added).
60. Jacoby & Janger, Ice Cube Bonds, supra note 6, at 922; Jacoby & Janger, Tracing Equity, supra
note 6, at 689-91; Edward J. Janger, The Logic and Limits of Liens, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 589, 595-
603.
61. Jacoby & Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 6, at 689-91.
62. ROY GOODE & LOUISE GULLIFER, GOODE AND GULLIFER ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CREDIT AND
SECURITY 126-33 (2017).
63. U.C.C. § 9-109 (Am. L. Inst. & Unif. L. Comm'n 1977).
64. Jacoby & Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 6, at 688-693.
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IV. PROCESS-REINFORCING RSAS
As we explain in Badges of Opportunism, RSAs are extraordinarily useful tools
for facilitating the confirmation of a plan of reorganization. They can facilitate
entitlement-based bargaining by increasing transparency. They allow creditors
to signal their support and gather momentum behind a deal. They can prime the
pump for other bidders by establishing a valuation and the outlines of acceptable
allocation. They can protect the process through various provisions, such as a
fiduciary-out provision that allows the debtor to accept a higher and better offer,
a no-material modification clause that allows signers to reconsider if circum-
stances change or important information comes to light, or a most-favored-na-
tion clause that assures equal treatment for similarly situated creditors.65
But RSAs can have a dark side. They may include provisions that undermine
the plan process and other bankruptcy values such as equal treatment.66 These
provisions sever the link between bankruptcy bargaining and entitlement. In our
view, RSAs must be judged against a more robust view of the values served by
the plan process: encouraging (1) disclosure, (2) voice and permitting, and (3)
a meaningful decision at the time of the vote.67
More importantly, to the extent that modern bankruptcy practice places
strains on the fifty-year-old disclosure and voting apparatus created in 1978, the
better approach is to fix the plan-confirmation process itself- not by stripping it
down but by addressing the identified problems directly. The need for speed
should be addressed through devices like the "ice cube bond." Claims trading can
be addressed through "mark-to-market governance," and governance-based is-
tortions can be fixed by ensuring that the continuation decision rests with the
fulcrum creditor, not a senior secured lender. The shortcomings of the Bank-
ruptcy Code should be fixed by legislative and judicial interventions, not by pri-
vate contracts.
CONCLUSION
Skeel has never been a classic "proceduralist." His scholarship is richer and
more nuanced: he has been more willing to embrace the range of values and
concerns expressed in the bankruptcy process. Further, the care with which Skeel
identifies and catalogues the distortions in a series of recent cases involving RSAs
is informative. Our agreements are likely greater than our disagreements. We
share the view that a sale of a firm under a confirmed plan, facilitated through
65. Janger & Levitin, supra note 21, at 175-76.
66. Id. at 182.




an RSA, is normatively superior to a hurry-up, all-asset sale, conducted through
a sale order approved a few weeks into the case. But Skeel's elevation of contract
over entitlement, and the failure to appreciate the role of process in linking
agreement o entitlement, is a common error made by finance-influenced schol-
ars.
We cannot escape the irony, therefore, that Skeel, as nuanced a scholar as he
is, is willing to scrap the process in favor of agreement- any agreement- regard-
less of its relationship to the entitlement baseline. Proceduralism has become re-
organization fiber alles, precisely the sin that proceduralists have long complained
about regarding traditionalists.
We, by contrast, would regulate RSAs more tightly. We are concerned about
provisions in RSAs that would loosen the link between contract and entitlement
by undercutting the process protections of the Bankruptcy Code. We would
scrutinize provisions in RSAs that offered special deals to particular creditors
(not linked to a legal entitlement), provisions that reward speedy agreement,
provisions that limit exit, and provisions that limit the flow of information.
While some of these provisions may turn out to be tolerable, they raise an infer-
ence of advantage taking and should be permitted only sparingly.
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